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 Introduction 
 
In general, financial markets’ convergence criteria focus on the interest rate dynamics, 
in particular, the term structure, uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) and the 
purchasing power parity (PPP). All of these theorems have acquired a new importance 
in the light of the financial integration process. The Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE) experienced floating rate regimes and current account liberalization 
prior to the integration in the European Union. This impacted to a significant extent 
on the evolution of macro-financial environment as well as the correlation with the 
business cycles of the developed countries4. After all, the interest rate connects the 
(macro-) economic system with the worldwide financial system. Apart from its 
important position in the architecture of the convergence process, the (short term) 
interest rate is also an important monetary policy instrument and a significant 
transmission mechanism. 
The UIP brings forth the arbitrage opportunities that conducts to the similarities in 
terms of return corresponding to comparable assets or liabilities denominated in 
domestic and foreign currencies. Usually, UIP is closely related to market efficiency; 
though recent research has shown that financial markets may not be efficient at all 
(Hughes Hallett and Richter, 2002). Although, UIP has  been investigated a lot for 
developed markets, research lacks for the CEE countries. The interest rate 
convergence criterion is analyzed within the term structure theory, having in mind a 
‘blended’ risk premium. These risk factors generate additional risk layers which lead 
to a higher interest rate than in the developed financial markets. The research sheds 
light on the sources of additional risks at country level, as well as on their joint 
evolution that could result in clustering of the CEE countries, based on similar interest 
rate dynamics. In this sense, we take into account the CEE country specific economic 
development during and after the transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market based economy.  
                                                 
4 See for example Hughes Hallett and Richter (2011). 
 In this paper we base our conclusions on several GARCH regressions5. So we use 
different econometric models to check the robustness of previous results. Having 
rejected UIP for most countries we look at specific factors in the CEE countries which 
may have contributed to these market imperfections. 
As a result, the paper sheds light on the CEE countries’ limited capacity to achieve 
nominal and real convergence within the near future. 
The analysis reveals a series of structural deficiencies related to financial system 
integration, soundness of public finance policies and institutional framework which 
all affect the potential for further integration in the euro-zone. 
This study is structured as follows: section two is the literature review, section three 
presents the methodology and results. Section four concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Literature on UIP is abundant that either tests the efficiency degree of financial 
markets or reveals the various mutual relationships between interest rates and 
exchange rates. Different studies illustrate the UIP on various time periods, seeking to 
reveal the importance of time in explaining the accumulation of risks.  Chinn & 
Meredith (2004), Mehl & Cappiello (2007) unveiled that UIP holds only for long 
periods of time (from five to ten years) in the virtue of the impact exerted by 
macroeconomic fundamental factors; the short term time horizon favors monetary 
policy actions that determine a negative correlation between exchange rate and 
interest rate. 
In line with this, Fujii and Chinn (2001) revealed the importance of long term 
variables on the UIP confirmation; emerging economies, with flexible exchange rate 
regimes, create incentive for the validation of the UIP theory, especially in the context 
of long term horizons.  
 
Lothiana & Wu (2011) made a research on a long period of time – 200 years- 
revealing that the UIP is validated only during some sub-periods of time. Other 
researches (Baillie & Bollerslev (2000), Flood & Rose (2002)) presented evidence 
                                                 
5 For a co-integration analysis we refer to Sarrmidi and Salleh (2011) who also found that UIP does not 
hold for the CEE countries. 
that it is only after 1990 that UIP becomes relevant.  Nevertheless, Chaboud and 
Wright (2005) uncovered that UIP holds on shorter time horizon in the context of 
speculation transactions. Bekaert et al. (2007) brought forth that UIP depends rather 
on foreign currency than on time horizon.  
 
Most of the researches have tested the UIP theorem based on countries specificities. 
There is an abundant literature dedicated to the analysis of a certain differentiation of 
the UIP according to the peculiarities of the macroeconomic environment, especially 
in the light of the differentiation between emerging and developed countries. The 
results usually rally upon two different lines: one encompassing a confirmation of the 
UIP at the level of the developed countries (Froot and Rogoff (1994), Taylor (2002), 
Sarno (2005), Bath (2011)), motivated by the absence of a potential lack of risk 
premiums because of an important stabilized macroeconomic environment, and the 
other reflecting the UIP failure in case of the emerging countries, which is explained 
by more deteriorated macroeconomic conditions. 
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) conducted a research on 28 developed and emerging 
economies based on data for the period 1976-1998; they show that it is more likely to 
give incentive to deviations from the UIP in case of countries with a more fragile 
macroeconomic environment, reflected particularly in lower GNP per capita, lower 
credit ratings and higher average inflation.  
Alper at. al (2009) emphasized that emerging markets have been characterized by 
weaker macroeconomic fundamentals, more volatile economic conditions, shallower 
financial markets and incomplete institutional reforms. These differences of structural 
nature in comparison with developed countries affect the assumptions underlying the 
UIP theory, which triggers the rejection of this theory.  
 
Most of the studies conducted during the last ten years unveiled a predominant 
violation of the UIP with no differentiation at the country level (Marey, 2004a-b, 
Peasaran and Wale, (2006), Verdelhan, 2006). This was explained in the light of risk 
premiums determined by transaction costs or central banks interventions. Zhang 
(2011) unveil that market dimension is a fundamental factor for the UIP confirmation; 
nevertheless, the current economic environment, characterized by a recessionary 
environment and government interventions, conducted to important deviations from 
the UIP theory. 
Other studies analyze the UIP in the context of different exchange rate regimes. Flood 
and Rose (2002) unveiled that UIP is confirmed especially in case of the fixed 
exchange rate regimes.  
 
However, there are only a few papers that concentrate mainly on CEE economies, 
most of the studies being focused on the developed countries. Bansal & Dahlquist 
(2000) and more recently Alper et al. (2009) highlighted that UIP is confirmed 
especially in case of emerging countries, emphasizing the role played by the high 
inflation rate. Mansori (2003) and Horobet et. al (2009, 2010) pointed out that for the 
Central and Eastern countries, testing the UIP leads to results that vary from one 
country to the other. Although the hypothesis is confirmed by positive slope 
coefficients, the corresponding statistic tests do not validate it. 
 
Other studies unveiled in an indirect manner the UIP failure among the CEE countries 
through the prism of additional risk premiums triggered by persistent inflation. 
Orlowski (2005) pointed out that the important risk premiums associated with the 
inflationary process conduct to negative phenomena such as recession periods, 
unemployment and large imbalances. 
Cihak and Mitra (2009) showed that CEE countries withstood in a robust manner the 
financial crisis experience in the context of the inflationary pressures reduction. 
Recently, Filipozzi and Harkmann (2010) analyzed the UIP in the light of the recent 
financial turbulences in the CEE area. The conclusions lead to the idea that the theory 
does not hold at the global level, but there are still many differences at the country 
level. As such, for countries with a higher degree of financial integration (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland) the theory is confirmed, in opposition with countries with 
a lower degree of financial integration (Bulgaria and Romania). 
Boubakri and Guillaumin (2010) uncovered the failure of the UIP in the CEEC 
countries through the prism of additional risk premiums. In parallel, Kocenda and 
Poghosyan (2010) valorized a similar methodology to the present study and brought 
forth an important variable, encompassing the foreign exchange risk premium of an 
amount of 4% on the grounds of the GARCH in mean model. 
Posta (2012) revealed the UIP failure at the level of the Czech Republic; the 
additional risk premium is impacted to an important extent by macroeconomic 
fundamentals, pointing to the volatility of long term nature.  
However, the current literature does not bring in a global view on the relevance of the 
UIP for the CEE countries that still did not adopt the single currency; the previous 
researches lack of an integrated approach on the interest rate behavior in the light of 
the UIP theory, that should take into account the similarities imposed by the common 
features of macroeconomic structures from these countries. Apart from that, the 
current referential literature has concentrated on the status of the UIP for these 
countries, provided mainly under the form of a final statistic result that revealed the 
rejection of this theory for the countries under review. Besides that, the question is to 
what extent this failure can be attributed to fundamental factors pertaining to the  
macro -financial economic environment of these countries, with a special emphasis on 
the multiple dimension of the nominal and real convergence process. 
The present paper envisages to fill the gap in the literature and to provide an 
integrated perspective on the structural factors that could drive a certain behavior of 
the interest rate under the aegis of the UIP theory in these countries.  
For this purpose, in an initial stage, the paper tests the UIP theory at the level of the 
Central and Eastern countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania) by the intermediary of three types of GARCH models (TGARCH, 
CGARCH and EGARCH models).  
The study valorizes the GARCH methodology having in mind their technical 
specificities that allow to address the volatility from a complex perspective: as such, 
TGARCH model permits the integration of non-linear behavior in the volatility while 
the EGARCH model gives the possibility to integrate asymmetries in the architecture 
in the light of a direct relationship between volatility and returns. Moreover, the 
CGARCH has in place the decomposition of the volatility on a two dimensional basis, 
allowing the separation of the long term component from the temporary one; in virtue 
of these technical peculiarities, the GARCH models create favorable conditions for a 
more robust analytical framework. 
Once applied the models in question, the paper analyzes the statistic output through 
the prism of specific aspects from the macro-financial environment of these countries 
that could explain the additional risk premiums that determined the UIP failure. 
The study contributes to the creation of a complex perspective on the ability of these 
countries to comply with the interest rate and inflation convergence criteria. Once 
revealed the risk layers that trigger important macroeconomic volatility, the research 
shed light on the countries limited capacity to achieve nominal and real convergence 
desideratum in the next period. 
The analysis reveals a series of structural deficiencies related to financial system 
depth, soundness of public finance policies or institutional framework that affect the 
further integration of these countries in the euro-zone. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This study approaches the UIP theory within the generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity models (GARCH) framework elaborated by Engle and 
Bollerslev (1986). This model is depicted by the following equations 
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where  
1=tD for tε  inferior to 0, 0=tD  otherwise 
and 
tε  represents the error term. 
 
The first equation represents the mean equation, where xt is the log-difference. 
The term εt is supposed to be conditionally normally distributed, being dependent on 
past information and capturing any unexpected appreciation or depreciation. 
The second and third equation reflect conditional variance ( 2th  ) which is conceived 
as a linear function of a time-dependent intercept, the lag in the squared realized 
residuals (ARCH term), an asymmetric term (γ) and the lagged conditional variance 
(GARCH term). 
The present study focuses on running up three types of GARCH models: EGARCH 
model, TGARCH model and CGARCH model.  
 
 
3.1 The EGARCH model 
 
The exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model was proposed by Nelson (1991) who 
expressed the conditional variance equation as: 
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The model has several advantages over the simple GARCH in the light of the 
( )2log tσ  term that is subject to modeling and even if the parameters are negative, 
2
tσ is positive. In this context, the elimination of potential non-negative constraints 
imposed on the model parameters is beneficial. In addition, the asymmetries are 
permissive in the EGARCH architecture in the light of a direct relationship between 
volatility and returns; consequently, if volatility and returns are negatively related, 
then λ  is negative as well.  
In the initial set up, Nelson assumed a Generalised Distribution Error (GED) structure 
for the errors. In essence GED represents a group of distributions that can be used for 
several types of series. For computational ease purposes, the application of the 
EGARCH model employs conditional normal errors rather than GED usage. 
 
3.2 The TGARCH model  
 
The Threshold GARCH model introduced by Rabemananjara and Zakoian (1993).  
brings forth various volatility reactions under the impact of previous shocks, 
integrating the non-linear behavior in the volatility as well.  
This model puts a special emphasis on the conditional standard deviation instead of 
conditional variance: 
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3.3 The CGARCH model 
 
The CGARCH model breaks down volatility by two components, a permanent and a 
transitory one. Permanent volatility component consists of a time-invariant permanent 
level (ω), an AR term (ρ) and the forecasted error (φ). 
The short term volatility component is obtained by the substraction of the long term 
volatility out of the total volatility, meaning 
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The forecasted error (φ) represents the difference between the lag in the squared 
realized residual and the forecast from the model (based on information available at 
time t-2). Engle and Victor (1993) reveal that CGARCH represents a GARCH (2,2) 
model, being less restrictive than a GARCH (1,1) model. 
 
 
3.4 The data 
 
The study valorizes exchange rate and interest rate data extracted on a monthly basis 
for the sample of five CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania) during the time period 1997-2011 from the European Central Bank website. 
The monthly observations extend at the level of the bilateral exchange rates reflecting 
both the euro and dollar parities of the national currencies of CEE countries. 
Indeed, one main criterion for the build up of this sample of countries consists 
precisely of the consistency of their monetary regimes. The countries that represent 
the focus of the present study have not adopted the unique currency yet and still 
benefit of their monetary autonomy.   
 
 
 
4. Discussion and results 
4.1 Analysis of the statistical output 
 
When testing for UIP it turned out that the residuals were heteroscedastic and 
autocorrelated. We therefore decided to test for UIP using different GARCH models, 
in particular we tested EGARCH, CGARCH and TGARCH for all countries and for 
the Dollar and Euro denominations. Out of all models tested, we then chose the ‘most 
appropriate’ one in terms of minimizing the Schwartz and Akaike criterion. Table 1 
summarises the results.  
 
Table 1: Overview of the GARCH Regression Results 
 
UIP confirmation UIP failure 
Model  Euro exchange 
rate 
Dollar exchange rate Euro exchange rate Dollar exchange rate 
TGARCH  
 
 
 
Czech Republic 
 
 
EGARCH Bulgaria 
 
 Romania Poland 
Romania 
CGARCH   Hungary 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
 
 
It turns out that UIP is rejected for all countries but one, namely Bulgaria. Moreover, 
different countries follow different data generating processes concerning their 
conditional standard deviations of the residuals. For example, for Romania the 
EGARCH was valid whilst for the Czech Republic it was the TGARCH model. Given 
the overwhelming evidence of UIP rejection in the CEE countries we may now ask 
what may have contributed to this result. Obviously, at this stage, we can only 
describe factors which are unique to the UIP countries. To test for these factors goes 
beyond the scope of this paper and requires further research.  
   
The analysed countries show similarities in terms of macroeconomic development 
since overcoming communism; these countries have followed a transition process 
from centralized planned economies to market based economies. 
In addition, all these countries are still autonomous in terms of monetary policy, 
having their own national currencies. The monetary regimes of these countries are 
characterized by similarities as all the countries implemented the inflation targeting 
policy, supported by a controlled floating exchange rate, except for Bulgaria which 
has in place a currency board regime since 1997. 
In essence, the successful currency board leads to stable exchange rate expectations 
which in turn are reflected in the total failure of the UIP in terms of Bulgarian leva 
parity against dollar while the parity against euro reveals a full confirmation of the 
UIP theory. 
Moreover, Bulgaria reveals the highest share of euro-denominated exports into GDP 
(25%)6 out of the CEE countries. Hence, the failure of the Dollar denominated UIP 
test. As a result, the acceptance of UIP for Bulgaria was implicit; a currency board 
(starting in 1997) implies a tight control on exchange rate dynamics, which leads to a 
high degree of exchange rate predictability, implying the mitigation of risk premia. 
 
For the Czech Republic UIP was rejected in case of both currencies. This could be 
explained by a potential risk aversion and implied high risk premia resulting in a 
difference between the interest rate differential and the expected change in the 
exchange rate. Despite a floating exchange rate regime towards the Dollar as well as 
the Euro, the Czech central bank is regularly intervening in the currency markets in 
order to stabilise the exchange rate volatility. Our results suggest that this does not 
lead to a stabilisation of the exchange rate expectations due to the discrete nature of 
those interventions. 
Figure 1 reveals that the Czech Krona has appreciated against the Euro for the last ten 
years. However, the figure also reveals a volatile behaviour of the exchange rate, 
                                                 
6 Eurostat data for the year 2011. 
which may have contributed to unstable expectations, especially for the years 
2007/2008. 
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Figure 1: Czech-Euro exchange rate 
 
 
For Hungary, the CGARCH model revealed that the coefficient of the temporary 
component is bigger than the permanent one. We interpret this that the country has 
flexible macroeconomic structures enabling it to absorb potential shocks. In this 
context, the additional risk premiums reflected by the UIP failure do not imply a 
speculative behavior. This interpretation of our findings is in line with Ghoshray and 
Morley (2012) who found similar results. 
Poland also rejects the UIP, though depending of the analysed currency the 
conditional standard deviation follows different processes. For the US-Dollar it is the 
EGARCH while for the Euro it is the CGARCH. 
 
Romania also rejected UIP. In this context, the exchange rate differential 
encompasses an additional risk premium. The dynamics of conditional standard 
deviation is somewhat different for the two currency pairs (figures 2 and 3). The 
peaks are more pronounced in case of the dollar exchange rate while the persistence is 
lower on shorter time-periods. In contrast the euro’s conditional standard deviation 
exhibits a persistence on longer periods of time; nevertheless, the standard deviation 
is decreasing during the last period of time.  
 
Figure 2: Romanian leu/Euro parity                  Figure 3: Romanian leu /Dollar parity 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Conditional Standard Deviation
                            
0
4
8
12
16
20
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Conditional Standard Deviation
 
 
 
We interpret the reduced Euro volatility of Romania in the recent years as an 
increasing focus of the Romanian economy towards the EU leading to a more stable 
exchange rate expectation. This cannot be claimed for the US   
 
In summary, the empirical results highlight that UIP is not confirmed. This 
predominant failure at the level of the CEE countries can be explained in the light of 
the violation of the assumptions that underlie the UIP theory. For this theory to hold,  
it is essential that a large number of factors occur such as perfect capital mobility, risk 
neutrality and negligeable transaction costs and so on. In addition, identical assets in 
terms of default risk, liquidity and maturity are also required for UIP confirmation. 
The underlying fundamentals of CEE countries, characterized by macroeconomic 
instability may have led to imperfect capital mobility, high transaction costs as well as 
risk aversion.  
Past studies unveiled that emerging countries exhibit a higher macroeconomic 
instability, especially due to their low potential to conduct counter-cyclical monetary 
and fiscal policies (Kočenda and Poghosyan, (2010), Frankel and Poonawala (2010)). 
 
An example of a CEE specific fundamental are the inflation dynamics which 
frequently violated the convergence criteria and eroded financial stability, 
contributing to an additional risk premium that envisaged the reward of the risk 
aversion behavior. 
A review of the inflationary process in the CEE countries reveals a pathway with 
strong inflation pressures (figures 4-6); indeed, in shorter periods of time, there is a 
temporary downturn dynamic, but the predominant feature encompasses a gradual 
increase. 
The inflationary pressures were explained through the prism of the transition process 
from the centralized planned economy to the market economy; in this context, shocks 
originating both in the supply and demand side, reflected in administered prices and 
excises duties adjustments, as well as various developments in commodity prices, 
conducted to the inflationary pressure.  
 
Figure 4: Inflation Rates of                             Figure 5: Inflation Rates of  
Bulgaria and Czech Republic                         Hungary and Romania 
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Figure 6: Inflation Rate of Poland 
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
POL_INFL
 
 
 
The initial inflationary pressure may be the result of the catching up process and the 
associated overheating phenomenon. This aspect is potentiated in the context of the 
fixed exchange rate regime that does not offer the opportunity to operate appropriate 
adjustments in order to accommodate the money supply to the evolution of the macro-
financial variables. 
Essentially, the catching up process favored an accelerated economic growth in the 
CEE countries; prior to financial crisis outbreak, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and 
Romania unveiled an average economic growth of more than 5%, while Hungary and 
Poland revealed an economic growth superior to 4%. Francis et. al (2002) pointed out 
that sustained economic growth conducts to the stabilization of the national currency; 
in the absence of an interest rate decline, excess returns increase and trigger the 
rejection of the UIP theory. 
 
Another potential explanation for the UIP failure might consist of the deterioration 
public finance indicators; except for Bulgaria that exhibits a budget deficit that 
complies with the requirements imposed by the relevant convergence criteria (below 
3% threshold level), the other CEE countries have not revealed compliance as for this 
indicator. Concerning public debt, Hungary seems to be the only country that revealed 
breaches of the 60% predetermined level. All the other countries unveil an important 
fiscal discipline from this perspective; for example, Bulgaria and Romania have an 
average public debt for this period of 16% and 30%, which is extremely conservative 
taking into account the reference value. 
The worsening of public finance indicators occurred in the context of a series of 
structural deficiencies; these deficiencies are reflected in a low level of government 
revenues collection. During the period 2004-2011, all the CEE countries reported 
relatively low average revenue as a proportion of GDP (Bulgaria and Romania – 30%, 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland – 40%) while countries from the euro-
zone reported values in excess of 100% for this indicator. Apart from that taxes made 
up less than 50 % of government revenue in Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia in 2011, but almost 85 % of government revenue in Denmark.  
The low level of government revenues collection has been explained by inefficient 
policies in this field determined by volatility or loopholes in the fiscal legislation 
framework that changed frequently under the impact of different political regimes 
(Kocenda et. al (2008)). In addition, official statistics reported that on average 40% 
out of taxable amounts currently remain undeclared in Romania and Bulgaria, 
highlighting the fiscal evasion phenomena.  
Other studies brought forth important value of corruption index for Bulgaria and 
Romania during the last decade, revealing that corruption risks in these two countries 
were widespread. The assessments performed for Romania and Bulgaria identified 
problematic areas: for Bulgaria there have been set forth a weak institutional 
framework and politically oriented management and business, while in Romania the 
assessment pointed out deficiencies in the public sector, triggered by significant 
involvement of political parties. 
As for the other CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), official 
statistics relative to the corruption index unveiled a better situation in comparison 
with Bulgaria and Romania; nevertheless, some structural changes are still required in 
order to ensure the harmonization with the euro area. 
Moreover, the integration of these countries in the EU required the amendment of 
legal framework in order to ensure compliance with the requirements imposed at the 
European level. Previous researches uncovered that the adaptation of the legal 
framework in various fields (financial and banking system, fiscal system, consumer 
protection) was not sufficient for the purposes of real convergence process since the 
amendments were of formal nature; in essence structural reforms were required in 
order to accelerate the catching up process. Their absence gave incentive to important 
deficiencies that determined the risk aversion behavior among investors and the 
corresponding risk premiums. 
 
The deterioration of budget balance contributes indirectly to inflationary pressures 
taking into consideration the mandatory financing process; from this perspective, the 
spiral effects might give incentive to additional inflationary effects. 
A similar effect might be explained in the light of the current account deficit that 
these countries revealed in the last decade; prior to the financial crisis outbreak, all the 
CEE countries have shown an important current account deficit, being in most of the 
cases demand driven. Since macroeconomic structures were not solid enough in order 
to cover the high consumption by internal production, the imports were predominant.  
At the end of 2008, share of net foreign asset position in GDP has deteriorated in most 
of the countries, reaching negative values of almost 100% in case of Hungary and 
80% in case of Bulgaria and Romania. 
Nevertheless, Zorzi et. al (2009) revealed that catching up process favored the 
financing of current and capital account deficits by the intermediary of foreign direct 
investments to an extent of more than 100% in case of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Poland and Romania. The potential for this financing mechanism decreased once 
ignited the financial crisis to almost 50%, but meanwhile, demand collapsed and the 
need for financing followed a similar trajectory.   
Nevertheless, the predominant rejection of the UIP theory at the level of the countries 
under review highlights that the equilibrium of the trade balance does not necessarily 
incur a positive impact on interest rate differential, shedding light on potential 
structural causes that lead to the accumulation of additional risk premiums (Balfoussia 
and Wickens (2007)). 
In line with these aspects, an important structural element that might explain the 
failure of this theory consists of the financial system development degree; previous 
researches7 revealed that there is a notable gap between the euro area and Central and 
Eastern Europe concerning the weight of financial system into GDP, which reached 
1584% in 2000 and 2287% in 2010 in the euro area, while in case of Central and 
Eastern European countries, it reaches much lower levels. 
The highest value of the indicator is recorded in Poland (248% of GDP in 2000 and 
372% in 2010), followed closely by the Czech Republic (85% in 2000 and 98% in 
2010), Hungary (80% in 2000 and 87.73% in 2010) and Bulgaria (50% in 2000 and 
95% in 2010). 
                                                 
7 Triandafil (2011). 
Romania occupies the last position in the ranking of European Central and Eastern 
countries in the financial system development degree, which in 2000 had a share of 
32% of GDP and 50% in 2010. 
Apart from that, the financial system is predominantly banking oriented. In opposition 
with the euro area where the banking system represents only 4% out of the financial 
system, the average value for this indicator amounts to 80% in the CEE countries.  In 
spite of other studies that revealed the accelerated rhythm of the financial integration 
in this geographical area during the last decade (Ferreira and Leon-Ledesma, ((2007)), 
significant discrepancies in the real convergence process between CEE countries and 
euro zone triggered by differences in the financial system development degree still 
persist. As such, financial system depth is still in an early stage, resulting in important 
transaction costs, which adds on other layers of risk premiums that determines the 
deviation from the UIP theory.  
 
As mentioned partly above the exchange rate regime in all countries is a controlled 
floating one, involving discretionary interventions from the central banks. These 
interventions have been considered in the literature as triggers for deviations from 
UIP (Cihac and Mitra, (2009)). Previous researches unveiled important interventions 
made by central authorities in order to sustain the exchange rate dynamic in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania beginning with 90’s; most of the researches 
brought forth that these interventions are effective only in the short run, favoring a 
slight appreciation of the national currency (Egert, (2007), Fidrmuc and Horváth 
((2008)), which brings forth the UIP theory rejection. Kocenda and Poghosyan (2010) 
underlined the important effect that monetary policy exerts on the behavior of 
exchange rates in Central and Eastern economies, unveiling the contribution of this 
effect in the pricing of contingent claims achieved by investors.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper is twofold: on one hand, it envisages to test UIP at the 
level of the CEE countries while on the other hand, it encompasses the identification 
of factors which may have determined the predominant failure of this theory and 
which are specific to the CEE countries.  
Initially, the rejection of the theory was explained in the light of the violation of the 
assumptions that underlie the UIP theory. For this theory to hold, it is essential that a 
large number of assumptions are vaild; perfect capital mobility, risk neutrality and 
negligeable transaction costs and so on. In addition, identical assets in terms of default 
risk, liquidity and maturity are required for UIP confirmation. 
The underlying fundamentals of CEE countries, characterized by an important 
macroeconomic instability resulting in imperfect capital mobility, high transaction 
costs as well as risk aversion.  
 
The research puts a special emphasis on the inflation processes in these countries; the 
important inflationary pressures that frequently implied violation of convergence 
criteria determined the erosion of the financial stability, contributing to an additional 
risk premium that envisaged the reward of the risk aversion behavior. 
The inflationary pressures can be explained by the transition process from a 
centralized planned economy to the market one. In this context, shocks originating 
both in the supply and demand side, reflect in administered prices and excises duties 
adjustments, as well as various developments in commodity prices, conducted to the 
inflationary pressure.  
Other possible explanations involve the catching up process and the overheating 
phenomenon of the economy that bring in significant effects on the inflationary 
pressures. This aspect is enforced by the fixed exchange rate regime that does not 
offer the opportunity to operate appropriate adjustments in order to accommodate the 
money supply to the evolution of the macro-financial variables. 
Another potential explanation for the UIP failure might consist of the deterioration 
public finance indicators. 
The deterioration of budget balance contributes to uncertainty regarding the 
macroeconomic development and therefore destabilizes exchange rate expectations. 
A similar effect might be explained in the light of the current account deficit that 
these countries revealed in the last decade. 
Nevertheless, the predominant rejection of the UIP theory in these countries  
highlights that the equilibrium of the trade balance does not necessarily incur a 
positive impact on interest rate differential, shedding light on potential structural 
causes that lead to the accumulation of additional risk premiums (Cihac and Mitra, 
(2009)). 
In line with these aspects, an important structural element that might explain the 
failure of UIP is the degree of development of the financial system.   
In spite of the accelerated rhythm of the financial integration in this geographical area 
during the last decade, significant discrepancies in the real convergence process 
between CEE countries and the Eurozone still persist. As such, the depth of the 
financial system in the economy is still at an early stage, resulting in high transaction 
costs, which adds another layer of risk premiums that determines the deviation from 
the UIP theory.  
 
Apart from that, the research unveiled inconsistencies at the level of the institutional 
framework which is marked by important involvement of the political factor. For this 
reason, the accumulation of additional risk premiums and the implicit rejection of the 
UIP occurred.  
The paper contributes to the creation of a complex perspective on the ability of these 
countries to comply with the Maastricht convergence criteria. The research sheds light 
on the countries limited capacity to achieve nominal and real convergence envisaged 
in the not too distant future. 
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Appendix no.1 – Regression results of the GARCH models at the country level 
 
Table 1 – Statistic output for the EGARCH model in case of Bulgaria  
(leva euro exchange rate)  
 
Dependent Variable: BG_IR 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 11/11/12   Time: 10:37 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:01 2005:07 
Included observations: 55 after adjusting endpoints 
Failure to improve Likelihood after 1 iteration 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
VAR_LEVA_EUR 0.005905 0.053081 0.111255 0.9114 
        Variance Equation 
C 1.337703 2273.834 0.000588 0.9995 
|RES|/SQR[GARCH](1) 0.010000 100.9132 9.91E-05 0.9999 
RES/SQR[GARCH](1) 0.010000 90.29484 0.000111 0.9999 
EGARCH(1) 0.010000 1655.973 6.04E-06 1.0000 
Mean dependent var 1.955800     S.D. dependent var 0.000000 
S.E. of regression 2.047269     Akaike info criterion 4.357998 
Sum squared resid 209.5654     Schwarz criterion 4.540483 
Log likelihood -114.8449     Durbin-Watson stat 0.008988 
 
 
Table 2 – Statistic output for the TGARCH model in case of Czech Republic  
(krona euro exchange rate)  
 
Dependent Variable: VAR_CZ_IR 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 11/11/12   Time: 10:40 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:01 2002:04 
Included observations: 16 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 118 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
VAR_EUR_CZK -831172 8.450001 -0.962269 0.3359 
        Variance Equation 
C 632.9076 512.1554 1.235772 0.2165 
ARCH(1) 1.383560 0.446689 3.097369 0.0020 
(RESID<0)*ARCH(1) -1.740127 0.106803 -16.29282 0.0000 
GARCH(1) 0.870573 0.298178 2.919646 0.0035 
R-squared -0.089329     Mean dependent var -58.93750 
Adjusted R-squared -0.485449     S.D. dependent var 219.9138 
S.E. of regression 268.0286     Akaike info criterion 12.57734 
Sum squared resid 790232.9     Schwarz criterion 12.81878 
Log likelihood -95.61874     Durbin-Watson stat 1.437509 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Statistic output for the CGARCH model in case of Czech Republic  
(krona dollar exchange rate)  
 
Dependent Variable: VAR_CZK_IR 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 11/11/12   Time: 10:40 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:02 2011:10 
Included observations: 129 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 237 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
VAR_USD_CZK -0.042929 0.415667 -0.103279 0.9177 
VAR_CZK_USD(1) -0.583197 0.025736 -22.66058 0.0000 
        Variance Equation 
Perm: C 64.81344 46.30229 1.399789 0.1616 
Perm: [Q-C] 0.951311 0.029152 32.63253 0.0000 
Perm: [ARCH-
GARCH] 
-0.462079 0.142967 -3.232063 0.0012 
Tran: [ARCH-Q] 1.083415 0.129035 8.396298 0.0000 
Tran: [GARCH-Q] -0.250709 0.092932 -2.697759 0.0070 
R-squared 0.282066     Mean dependent var 0.285015 
Adjusted R-squared 0.246758     S.D. dependent var 12.11288 
S.E. of regression 10.51271     Akaike info criterion 7.240141 
Sum squared resid 13483.08     Schwarz criterion 7.395325 
Log likelihood -459.9891     Durbin-Watson stat 2.195861 
 
 
Table 4 – Statistic output for the CGARCH model in case of Hungary 
(forint euro exchange rate)  
 
Dependent Variable: VAR_IR_HUNG 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 11/11/12   Time: 10:49 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:01 2011:08 
Included observations: 128 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
SQR(GARCH) 0.000769 0.092213 0.008338 0.9933 
VAR_IR_HUNG -0.061472 0.022053 -2.787465 0.0053 
VAR_EUR_HUNG(1) 0.258765 0.079385 3.259641 0.0011 
        Variance Equation 
Perm: C 4.410671 1.439320 3.064414 0.0022 
Perm: [Q-C] 0.974425 0.027226 35.79064 0.0000 
Perm: [ARCH-
GARCH] 
0.021230 0.030606 0.693664 0.4879 
Tran: [ARCH-Q] 0.071916 0.078514 0.915961 0.3597 
Tran: [GARCH-Q] -0.640152 0.202736 -3.157561 0.0016 
R-squared 0.128306     Mean dependent var 0.138228 
Adjusted R-squared 0.077457     S.D. dependent var 2.136537 
S.E. of regression 2.052125     Akaike info criterion 4.234120 
Sum squared resid 505.3459     Schwarz criterion 4.412372 
Log likelihood -262.9837     Durbin-Watson stat 1.768573 
 
 
Table 5 – Statistic output for the CGARCH model in case of 
Hungary (forint dollar exchange rate)  
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: VAR_IR_USD 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 11/11/12   Time: 10:50 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:02 2011:10 
Included observations: 129 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 28 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
GARCH -0.008367 0.003355 -2.493688 0.0126 
VAR_USD_HUNG 0.077754 0.054499 1.426706 0.1537 
VAR_HUNG_USD(1) -0.702103 0.029339 -23.93083 0.0000 
VAR_HUNG_USD(2) -0.243981 0.043642 -5.590546 0.0000 
        Variance Equation 
Perm: C 100.0178 53.19676 1.880149 0.0601 
Perm: [Q-C] 0.744625 0.600529 1.239949 0.2150 
Perm: [ARCH-
GARCH] 
0.363640 0.020323 17.89334 0.0000 
Tran: [ARCH-Q] 0.428973 0.143587 2.987539 0.0028 
Tran: [GARCH-Q] 0.275235 0.456050 0.603520 0.5462 
R-squared 0.319845     Mean dependent var 0.242625 
Adjusted R-squared 0.274501     S.D. dependent var 11.82905 
S.E. of regression 10.07554     Akaike info criterion 7.009786 
Sum squared resid 12181.97     Schwarz criterion 7.209308 
Log likelihood -443.1312     Durbin-Watson stat 1.915949 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Statistic output for the CGARCH model in case of Poland (zlot euro 
exchange rate)  
 
Dependent Variable: VAR_POL_IR 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 08/12/12   Time: 19:42 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:01 2011:07 
Included observations: 127 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 23 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
GARCH 0.030834 0.049338 0.624950 0.5320 
VAR_POL_EUR 0.170935 0.049654 3.442543 0.0006 
VAR_POL_EUR(1) 0.451548 0.072079 6.264618 0.0000 
VAR_POL_EUR(2) -0.076208 0.075281 -1.012323 0.3114 
VAR_POL_IR(1) -0.037258 0.046579 -0.799879 0.4238 
VAR_POL_IR(2) -0.101563 0.053180 -1.909783 0.0562 
        Variance Equation 
Perm: C 4.274553 1.332452 3.208036 0.0013 
Perm: [Q-C] 0.907794 0.104624 8.676693 0.0000 
Perm: [ARCH-
GARCH] 
0.114773 0.059064 1.943187 0.0520 
Tran: [ARCH-Q] -0.068395 0.054691 -1.250555 0.2111 
Tran: 
(RES<0)*[ARCH-Q] 
0.263968 0.088782 2.973205 0.0029 
Tran: [GARCH-Q] -0.911144 0.055283 -16.48152 0.0000 
R-squared 0.287209     Mean dependent var 0.148675 
Adjusted R-squared 0.219029     S.D. dependent var 2.546397 
S.E. of regression 2.250317     Akaike info criterion 4.398478 
Sum squared resid 582.3513     Schwarz criterion 4.667220 
Log likelihood -267.3034     Durbin-Watson stat 1.825969 
 
 
Table 7 – Statistic output for the EGARCH model in case of Poland (zlot dollar 
exchange rate)  
 
Dependent Variable: VAR_POL_IR 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 11/11/12   Time: 15:01 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:02 2011:09 
Included observations: 128 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 26 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
GARCH -0.006306 0.004682 -1.346812 0.1780 
VAR_POL_USD -0.049348 0.055255 -0.893089 0.3718 
VAR_POL_USD(1) -0.734109 0.021157 -34.69826 0.0000 
VAR_POL_USD(2) -0.250650 0.026608 -9.419987 0.0000 
        Variance Equation 
C -0.030848 0.345326 -0.089330 0.9288 
|RES|/SQR[GARCH](
1) 
1.919678 0.214627 8.944232 0.0000 
RES/SQR[GARCH](1
) 
0.016608 0.134549 0.123437 0.9018 
EGARCH(1) 0.667056 0.068469 9.742386 0.0000 
R-squared 0.273984     Mean dependent var 0.166396 
Adjusted R-squared 0.231633     S.D. dependent var 11.84368 
S.E. of regression 10.38176     Akaike info criterion 6.851139 
Sum squared resid 12933.71     Schwarz criterion 7.029391 
Log likelihood -430.4729     Durbin-Watson stat 1.682151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Statistic output for the EGARCH model in case of Romania (leu euro 
exchange rate)  
 
 
Dependent Variable: VAR_ROM_IR 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 11/11/12   Time: 15:04 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:01 2006:05 
Included observations: 65 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 29 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
GARCH -0.143081 0.084957 -1.684144 0.0922 
VAR_ROM_EUR -0.005522 0.004495 -1.228589 0.2192 
VAR_ROM_EUR(1) 0.249605 0.045220 5.519825 0.0000 
        Variance Equation 
C 0.014328 0.464351 0.030856 0.9754 
|RES|/SQR[GARCH](
1) 
1.155124 0.332275 3.476414 0.0005 
RES/SQR[GARCH](1
) 
-0.071082 0.155038 -0.458482 0.6466 
EGARCH(1) -0.603821 0.220460 -2.738910 0.0062 
R-squared 0.199946     Mean dependent var -0.306114 
Adjusted R-squared 0.117182     S.D. dependent var 1.804226 
S.E. of regression 1.695221     Akaike info criterion 3.652943 
Sum squared resid 166.6790     Schwarz criterion 3.887108 
Log likelihood -111.7206     Durbin-Watson stat 1.658797 
 
 
Table 9 – Statistic output for the EGARCH model in case of Romania (leu dollar 
exchange rate)  
 
Dependent Variable: VAR_ROM_IR 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Date: 11/11/12   Time: 15:05 
Sample(adjusted): 2001:02 2006:04 
Included observations: 63 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 34 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
VAR_ROM_IR 0.034565 0.018238 1.895221 0.0581 
VAR_ROM_USD(1) -0.629622 0.053343 -11.80319 0.0000 
VAR_ROM_USD(1) 0.013068 0.035954 0.363456 0.7163 
        Variance Equation 
C 0.449799 0.416900 1.078911 0.2806 
|RES|/SQR[GARCH](
1) 
1.023536 0.279045 3.668003 0.0002 
RES/SQR[GARCH](1
) 
-0.916004 0.229488 -3.991510 0.0001 
EGARCH(1) 0.694267 0.110383 6.289612 0.0000 
R-squared 0.335654     Mean dependent var 0.499247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.264474     S.D. dependent var 10.19254 
S.E. of regression 8.741409     Akaike info criterion 6.920581 
Sum squared resid 4279.085     Schwarz criterion 7.158707 
Log likelihood -210.9983     Durbin-Watson stat 2.108529 
 
